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THE USA PATRIOT ACT: BIG BROTHER OR
BUSINESS AS USUAL?
JAMES B. PERRINE*
On September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked jet airliners and
flew them into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
Another hijacked jet airliner crashed into a field in Pennsylvania.
The "War on Terror" began. In response to, and shortly after,
these attacks, Congress passed, and President Bush signed, the
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA
PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001.1 A debate over the constitutionality
and appropriateness of the Patriot Act has furiously raged since
its enactment.
Critics argue that the Patriot Act is a knee-jerk reaction to
the events of September 11th that greatly expands the powers
and reach of law enforcement officials and unduly tramples
upon civil liberties.2 Proponents of the Patriot Act contend that
it updates investigative techniques to account for new technolo-
gies and the practices of terrorists-techniques needed to track
and capture terrorists and thwart their attacks.3 This Article
examines this debate with respect to provisions of the Patriot Act
permitting delayed notification or "sneak-and-peek" search war-
rants, roving wiretaps, and compelled production of business
records-three areas of particular concern to opponents and
supporters of this controversial piece of legislation.
* Assistant United States Attorney, Middle District of Alabama. J.S.D.,
L.L.M., Yale University Law School; J.D., University of Alabama School of Law.
The views expressed herein are solely the author's personal views and do not
represent the official views or policies of the Department ofJustice or any of its
subdivisions. The author would like to thank Jack Park, Pamela Bucy, and Mat-
thew Berry for their comments and suggestions. Any errors in the article are
solely those of the author.
This Article is copyright © 2004 by James B. Perrine. All rights reserved.
1. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter Patriot Act].
2. See, e.g.,John W. Whitehead & Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting "Enduring Free-
dom" for "Homeland Security": A Constitutional Analysis of the USA PATRIOT Act and
the Justice Department's Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 Am. U. L. REv. 1081, 1083
(2002) (arguing that the Patriot Act tramples Americans' liberties in a variety of
ways).
3. See U.S. Dep't of justice, Preserving Life and Liberty, at http://www. life-
andliberty.gov (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
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For each of these provisions, the question is the degree to
which the Patriot Act expands the power of government officials
or applies existing law enforcement techniques to the investiga-
tion and prosecution of terrorists. A review of the legal land-
scape before and after the Patriot Act shows that, at least in these
three areas, Congress has neither created nor dramatically
increased the purview of "Big Brother," but, rather, has made
available for the investigation of terrorists tools to which law
enforcement officials were already privy in other contexts.4 Of
course, the normative question of whether law enforcement offi-
cials should even have access to such tools is a separate debate
and one outside the scope of this Article.
I. DELAYED NOTIFICATION SEARCH WARRANTS
A. The Legality of Delayed Notification Search Warrants Pre-Patriot
Act
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution protects the
"right of the people" to be free from "unreasonable searches and
seizures" and provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."5 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 sets
forth the rules pertaining to the issuance, execution, and return
of search warrants.6 As part of the standard search warrant pro-
cedure, law enforcement officers must provide notice of the
search and the seizure of any property during such search to the
individual whose premises were searched.7 This notice is typi-
cally provided by giving the person, or leaving at the premises, a
copy of the warrant and a receipt of any property taken.8 Not
surprisingly, situations arise, however, where law enforcement
officers would rather not apprize an individual of a search and
seizure.9 In such cases, the issue arises whether officers may
4. At least one other scholar has also concluded that the Patriot Act did
not significantly expand the investigatory powers of law enforcement officers
relative to their pre-Patriot Act capabilities. Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance
Law After the USA PATRIOT Act: The Big Brother that Isn't, 97 Nw. U. L. Rsv. 607,
608 (2003) (concluding that the Patriot Act "made mostly minor amendments
to the electronic surveillance laws" and "is not the Big Brother law that many
have portrayed it to be").
5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
6. FED. R. CRiM. P. 41.
7. Id. 41(f).
8. See id.
9. Both proponents and critics of the Patriot Act agree that delayed noti-
fication warrants are justified in certain circumstances, such as where notice
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search the premises but delay notifying the occupant of the
search.
Prior to the Patriot Act, "delayed notification" or "sneak-and-
peek" search warrants were permitted in several jurisdictions.
10
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Freitas," was the seminal
court to address directly the legality of delayed notification
search warrants. In Freitas I, agents of the Drug Enforcement
Administration ("DEA") first obtained a number of standard
search warrants to search a target's home for evidence of his
manufacturing of methamphetamine. The day after obtaining
these standard search warrants, but prior to executing them, a
DEA agent applied for and received a "surreptitious entry" war-
rant for the target's house. The warrant authorized the agents to
enter the house while no one was there and look around for evi-
dence of a methamphetamine lab but forbade them from seizing
any tangible property. The warrant did not contain a notice
requirement. The agents executed this warrant on the same day
the magistrate issued it. Approximately one week after executing
the surreptitious warrant, the agents executed the standard
search warrants, found evidence of a methamphetamine lab, and
arrested the defendant.12
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized pur-
suant to the standard search warrants claiming that such evi-
dence was the fruit of an unconstitutional search executed under
the surreptitious warrant." The district court granted the defen-
dant's motion to suppress because the surreptitious warrant vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment and Rule 41 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure.1 4 Moreover, the district court ruled that
the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule announced in
United States v. Leon 5 did not support admission of the
evidence.
1 6
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The
appellate court concluded that the surreptitious warrant was
would likely lead to the destruction of evidence sought under the warrant. See
infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
10. See generally Kevin Corr, Sneaky but Lawful: The Use of Sneak and Peek
Search Warrants, 43 U. KAN. L. REv. 1103 (1995) (examining cases upholding
delayed notification search warrants).
11. 800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Freitas 1].
12. Id. at 1453.
13. Id. at 1453-54.
14. Id. at 1454.
15. 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (holding that evidence seized pursuant to a
defective warrant is still admissible as long as a reasonable officer would have
relied in good faith on the validity of the warrant).
16. See Freitas I, 800 F.2d at 1454.
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defective and violated Rule 41 and the Fourth Amendment
because it did not provide any means of notice to the person
whose premises were to be searched.1 7 In particular, the court
held that "the warrant was constitutionally defective in failing to
provide explicitly for notice within a reasonable, but short, time
subsequent to the surreptitious entry. Such time should not
exceed seven days except upon a strong showing of necessity.""
The court, however, remanded the case to the lower court for a
decision on whether Leon saved the evidence from suppression.' 9
On the subsequent appeal from the district court's decision
that Leon did not apply, the Ninth Circuit held that the agents
had, indeed, reasonably relied in good faith on the surreptitious
warrant and that evidence from the search was admissible.2 ° The
court further explained that even though it found the surrepti-
tious warrant constitutionally defective in its first opinion, that
error was not a "clear constitutional violation."2 ' The court reit-
erated that the "constitutional infirmity did not emanate from
the surreptitious nature of the entry, or even from the fact that
the warrant failed to provide for contemporaneous notice of the
search."22 Rather, the warrant suffered from a complete lack of a
notice requirement. Simply stated, if the warrant "had provided
for post-search notice within seven days, it would not have
crossed over the constitutional line. '23
Four years later in 1990, the Second Circuit analyzed the
legality of delayed notification warrants. In United States v. Ville-
gas, 4 DEA agents suspected that individuals were using a farm to
manufacture cocaine powder. To confirm their suspicions,
agents applied for a search warrant "to take photographs but not
physically to seize any tangible items of evidence."2 The agents
also asked to postpone giving notice of the search for seven days,
17. Id. at 1456.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1457-58.
20. United States v. Freitas, 856 F.2d 1425, 1432 (9th Cir. 1988) [herein-
after Freitas I1]; see also United States v. Johns, 948 F.2d 599, 605-06 (9th Cir.
1991) (applying Leon to delayed notification search warrant); United States v.
Ludwig, 902 F. Supp. 121, 127 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (also applying Leon to delayed
notification warrants and finding the evidence admissible).
21. Freitas II, 856 F.2d at 1433 (citing United States v. Stefanson, 648 F.2d
1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1981)).
22. Id. (citing Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 247-48 (1979)
(rejecting as "frivolous" the argument that "covert entries are unconstitutional
for their lack of notice")).
23. Id.
24. 899 F.2d 1324 (2d Cir. 1990).
25. Id. at 1330.
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or for a longer period if the court so permitted. The district
court issued the delayed notification search warrant and
required notice to the person whose premises were searched
within seven days.26 The court, however, would permit an exten-
sion of the notice period for good cause shown.
27 The agents
executed the warrant and thereafter requested eight separate
extensions of the notice period to permit them to continue their
investigation unbeknownst to the targets. The district court
granted each extension such that notice was not given to the
individuals until they were arrested after the execution of a stan-
dard search warrant at the farm.
28
The defendants sought to suppress the evidence seized dur-
ing the execution of the standard search warrant on the grounds
that it was the product of the allegedly unconstitutional delayed
notification warrant. The district court rejected this argument
and the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision.
29
The court started its analysis by noting that "[w] hen nondis-
closure of the authorized search is essential to its success, neither
Rule 41 nor the Fourth Amendment prohibits covert entry.""
°
Such entry without notice to the defendant is permissible pro-
vided that certain safeguards are in place. "First, the court
should not allow the officers to dispense with advance or contem-
poraneous notice of the search unless they have made a showing
of reasonable necessity for the delay."'" This showing is not as
rigorous as that required for a wiretap but still must provide
good reason for the delay in notification.32 "Second, if a delay in
notice is to be allowed, the court should nonetheless require the
officers to give the appropriate person notice of the search
within a reasonable time after the covert entry."3 Though what
constitutes a "reasonable time" is a fact-specific determination,
the Villegas court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that such period
should not exceed seven days, absent good cause for extending
the notification period.3 4 Since the warrant at issue satisfied
each of these safeguards, the court held that the delayed notifica-
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1338.
28. Id. at 1331.
29. Id. at 1336.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1337.
32. See id. (noting that for a wiretap, agents must certify pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 2518(3) (c) that "normal investigative procedures have been tried and
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tion warrant was constitutional and any evidence seized as a
product of such warrant was admissible.35
Importantly, the Villegas court commented that a "covert-
entry search for only intangibles" is, comparatively, not a particu-
larly intrusive search. In particular, the court noted several limi-
tations of a delayed notification warrant:
It is less intrusive than a conventional search with physical
seizure because the latter deprives the owner not only of
privacy but also of the use of his property. It is less intru-
sive than a wiretap or video camera surveillance because
the physical search is of relatively short duration, focuses
the search specifically on the items listed in the warrant,
and produces information as of a given moment, whereas
the electronic surveillance is ongoing and indiscriminate,
gathering in any activities within its mechanical focus.
Thus, several of the limitations on wiretaps or videotape
surveillance, such as duration and minimization, would be
superfluous in the context of a physical search.36
The Second Circuit subsequently confirmed its approval of
delayed notification warrants in United States v. Pangburn.7 In
that case, the appellate court upheld the validity of two surrepti-
tious warrants that permitted agents to search a storage locker,
even though the warrants did not contain a notice provision.3 8
Though the Ninth Circuit in Freitas I held that the complete
omission of a notice provision rendered a warrant constitution-
ally defective, the Pangburn court stated that the panel in Villegas
did not subscribe to this position.39 The difference between the
positions of the Ninth and Second Circuits lies in the source of
the notice requirement. The Ninth Circuit grounds the notice
requirement in the Fourth Amendment,4" while the Second Cir-
cuit grounds it in Rule 41."' Accordingly, the Second Circuit
views a warrant's failure to speak to notice as a statutory, but not
constitutional, violation.4 2
35. Id. at 1338.
36. Id. at 1337.
37. 983 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1993).
38. See id. at 449-50.
39. See id. at 454.
40. Freitas I, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986).
41. See Pangburn, 983 F.2d at 455.
42. See id.; see also United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 403 (4th Cir.
2000) (recognizing the split between the Ninth and Second Circuits and agree-
ing with the Second Circuit that Rule 41, not the Constitution, requires notice
of an executed search).
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A violation of Rule 41 leads to exclusion of evidence only
where:
(1) there was "prejudice" in the sense that the search
might not have occurred or would not have been so abra-
sive if the Rule had been followed, or (2) there is evidence
of intentional and deliberate disregard of a provision in
the Rule.43
Since the agents would have conducted the search in exactly the
same way if notice had been given within seven days of the search
and did not intentionally disregard the notice requirement, hav-
ing sought review of the warrant from a district attorney and
magistrate, the Second Circuit held that the violation of Rule 41
for not providing notice to the defendant did not justify suppres-
sion of the challenged evidence.
4 4
B. The Patriot Act Codifies Existing Law on Delayed
Notification Warrants
The Patriot Act, as shown by its express provisions, merely
codifies much of the existing law relating to delayed notification
warrants.4" More specifically, section 213 of the Patriot Act
added the following section to 18 U.S.C. § 3103a:
(b) Delay.-With respect to the issuance of any warrant or
court order under this section, or any other rule of law, to
search for and seize any property or material that consti-
tutes evidence of a criminal offense in violation of the laws
of the United States, any notice required, or that may be
required, to be given may be delayed if-
(1) the court finds reasonable cause to believe that provid-
ing immediate notification of the execution of the warrant
may have an adverse result (as defined in section 2705);
(2) the warrant prohibits the seizure of any tangible prop-
erty, any wire or electronic communication (as defined in
section 2510), or, except as expressly provided in chapter
121, any stored wire or electronic information, except
where the court finds reasonable necessity for the seizure;
and
(3) the warrant provides for the giving of such notice
within a reasonable period of its execution, which period
43. Pangburn, 983 F.2d at 455 (citing United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377,
386-87 (2d Cir. 1975)).
44. Id.
45. Of course, the Patriot Act in no way altered the probable cause and
particularity requirements for search warrants under the Fourth Amendment.
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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may thereafter be extended by the court for good cause
shown.
46
An "adverse result" referenced in § 3103a(b) (1) justifying
delayed notification occurs where immediate notification may
cause:
(A) endangering [of] the life or physical safety of an
individual;
(B) flight from prosecution;
(C) destruction of or tampering with evidence;
(D) intimidation of potential witnesses; or
(E) . . . serious[ ] jeopard[y] [to] an investigation or
unduly delaying a trial.47
A comparison of the pre-Patriot Act case law and section 213
of the Patriot Act shows that Congress did not broaden greatly, if
at all, the circumstances in which law enforcement officials may
request a court to delay notice of a search warrant.48 Section 213
authorizes a court to issue a delayed notification warrant only
where reasonable cause exists that immediate notification will
lead to one or more of the "adverse results" listed above. This
requirement is akin, if not identical, to the "good reason" safe-
guard delineated by the Villegas court.4 9 In fact, in Villegas, the
Second Circuit ruled that the agents' representation that surveil-
lance on the target's farm was "extremely difficult" was a permis-
sible justification for the issuance of the delayed notification
warrant.5" Section 213 does not list the ineffectiveness of other
investigatory techniques as a reason to authorize a delayed notifi-
cation warrant, though such a standard is similar to the more
46. 18 U.S.C. § 3103a (2000 & Supp. I 2001).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a) (2) (2000).
48. In a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Fein-
stein states thus:
But I think many missed the fact that 213 is, for the most part, as I
understand it, a codification of authority that was created by case law
in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 1996
and the U.S. Court of Appeals in the Second Circuit in 1990. If I
understand what we did in 213, it was actually narrower than the
authority that existed before the Patriot Act in the Ninth Circuit and
the Second Circuit, and that we provided in this bill certain additional
safeguards in the area of sneak and peek so that civil liberties are actu-
ally better protected now in California, Idaho, New York and in other
states that fell under those jurisdictions than before the Patriot Act.
Protecting Our National Security from Terrorist Attacks: A Review of Terrorism Investiga-
tions and Prosecutions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong.
(2003) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Member, S. Judiciary Comm.).
49. United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1337 (2d Cir. 1990).
50. Id. at 1338.
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rigorous certification agents must make to obtain a wiretap.
5
The Freitas court specifically held that the Fourth Amendment
did not mandate a showing that other investigatory techniques
were inadequate prior to the issuance of a delayed notification
warrant.5 2 Section 213 also adopted the requirement in Freitas
and Villegas that law enforcement officers provide notice of the
search within a reasonable period of its execution." Congress,
unlike the Freitas court, did not limit this time period to seven
days.54 Like the Ninth and Second Circuits, section 213 permits
the court to extend the notice period for good cause shown.
5 5
Though not expressly stated in section 213, prior precedent sug-
gests that agents will need to make a "fresh showing" of an
adverse result from providing notice to justify an extension of the
notice period.5 6
The "reasonable necessity" standard for seizure of property
under a delayed notification warrant is a feature of section 213
not readily evident from a review of case law. The law enforce-
ment agents in Freitas and Villegas requested permission from the
court only to enter the premises, look around, and take photo-
graphs, but did not seek to seize any tangible property within the
premises.5 7 Consequently, neither the Ninth nor the Second Cir-
cuit addressed the legality of the seizure of property pursuant to
a delayed notification warrant, though the Villegas court noted
that a covert search for surveillance was less intrusive than a con-
ventional search and seizure of property.58 The Fourth Circuit,
however, has held that the Fourth Amendment was not contra-
vened where agents seized property pursuant to a search warrant
that required immediate notification, but where the agents did
not provide such notice until forty-five days after the seizure of
property.59 The Patriot Act's requirement for the seizure of
51. See supra note 32.
52. Freitas I, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986).
53. See Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1337.
54. See Freitas 1, 800 F.2d at 1456.
55. See id.; see also Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1337.
56. Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1337 ("[Tlhe applicant should be required to
make a fresh showing of the need for further delay.") (referring to Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59-60 (1967)).
57. Freitas I, 800 F.2d at 1453; Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1330.
58. Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1337.
59. United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 397, 403 (4th Cir. 2000)
(" [W] e conclude that the failure of the team executing the warrant to leave
either a copy of the warrant or a receipt for the items taken did not render the
search unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."). See also United States v.
Heal, No. 91-30349, 1992 WL 203884, at *2 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 1992) (discussing
approvingly a delayed notification search warrant permitting the actual seizure
of controlled substances).
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property under a delayed notification warrant is thus more strin-
gent than what the Fourth Amendment otherwise mandates for
seizures under conventional warrants (i.e., probable cause of
criminal activity). This higher burden reflects Congress's sensi-
tivity toward delayed notification warrants and addresses the
Ninth Circuit's concern that "surreptitious entries be closely cir-
cumscribed."6 This "reasonable necessity" requirement in sec-
tion 213 also reduces the probability of seizure during the
execution of a delayed notification warrant because agents may
decide to use the covert entry only to gain additional information
that could then be used to support a later conventional search
warrant.
The Patriot Act has thus clarified the jurisprudence on
delayed notification warrants. Section 213 provides uniformity
across the federal districts on the standards governing the issu-
ance of a delayed notification warrant, the time period for notice
to be provided to the affected persons, and the extension of the
notice period. As the Ninth Circuit observed in Freitas, Con-
gress's involvement in this area is preferable to a case-by-case
modification of Rule 41 across the different circuits.6 1 In fact,
section 213 directly answers the request of one scholar:
Perhaps one day Rule 41 will be amended to specifically
mention surreptitious entry warrants and provide guidance
in their use. Such amendments would promote uniformity
among the circuits and set in place a concrete procedure
to follow. The case-by-case, circuit-by-circuit approach to
these warrants fails to assist law enforcement officers, pros-
ecutors, and the courts in those circuits where the issue has
not yet been sufficiently litigated.6 2
One issue still outstanding post-section 213 is whether an
error in giving notice pursuant to a delayed notification warrant
is a constitutional or statutory violation. Arguably, after the pas-
sage of the Patriot Act, a court will not issue a search warrant
without abiding by section 213's requirement that notice be
given "within a reasonable period of its execution."6 By mandat-
ing that notice must be provided, Congress has directly
addressed the Ninth Circuit's concern about a warrant's com-
plete lack of reference to notice-the particular error that the
60. See Freitas I, 800 F.2d at 1456.
61. Id. at 1455 ("[T]he adjustments to Rule 41 necessary to regulate sur-
reptitious entries can better be accomplished by the rulemakers and Congress
than by the case-by-case work of courts.").
62. Corr, supra note 10, at 1115-16.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(3) (2000 & Supp. I 2001).
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court found to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Other
errors relating to the notice provided pursuant to a delayed noti-
fication warrant should be analyzed, as the Ninth and Second
Circuits have held, under the test discussed supra for "technical,"
"non-fundamental" violations of Rule 41.
C. Criticisms of Section 213 of the Patriot Act
Despite the benefits of section 213 in clarifying the law relat-
ing to delayed notification warrants, critics seek to repeal and/or
amend its provisions. The proposed "Security and Freedom
Ensured Act (the "SAFE Act") is representative of the proposals
to amend section 213.64 First, the SAFE Act would shorten the
list of "adverse results" justifying the issuance of a delayed notifi-
cation warrant. Under the SAFE Act, a delayed notification war-
rant could issue only where immediate notification would (1)
"endanger the life or physical safety of an individual," (2) "result
in flight from prosecution," or (3) "result in the destruction of,
or tampering with, the evidence sought under the warrant."65
Under the SAFE Act, an "adverse result" would no longer include
a situation where immediate notice would result in the intimida-
tion of potential witnesses or otherwise seriously jeopardize an
investigation or unduly delay a trial.6 6
Striking the last two definitions of "adverse result" under sec-
tion 213 seems unprincipled. The intimidation of potential wit-
nesses is just another form of the "destruction of evidence"
justification for the issuance of a delayed notification warrant
that is included in the SAFE Act. As every prosecutor knows, a
live witness is frequently the best, and sometimes the only, evi-
dence of a fact, and preservation of a credible witness to testify to
a defendant's activities is as important as preserving physical evi-
dence of a defendant's crime. Elimination of the "catch-all provi-
sion" of section 213 for an adverse result also appears to be
unfounded. A criminal investigation, especially one involving
terrorists, is fraught with nuances making it more of an art than a
science. Delaying notice for a reasonable time subsequent to the
surreptitious entry to address a concern that "seriously jeopar-
dizes an investigation" is akin to the other "adverse result" cate-
gories untouched by the SAFE Act because they all seek to aid
investigatory efforts.
64. Security and Freedom Ensured Act of 2003 (SAFE Act), S. 1709,
108th Cong. § 3.
65. Id.
66. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2705 & 3103a(b) (defining "adverse result").
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The SAFE Act also sets as seven days the maximum length of
time to delay notice of the surreptitious entry and allows an
extension of this period only if immediate notice would produce
one or more of its justifications for the initial issuance of a
delayed notification warrant.67 Amending section 213 to man-
date notice within seven days rather than within a "reasonable
period" after execution of the warrant limits a court's ability to
tailor a delayed notification warrant to the particular facts of an
investigation. In most instances, as the Freitas and Villegas courts
held, seven days is an appropriate period for agents to provide
notice of the search. In an exceptional case, however, seven days
may not be a "reasonable period" within which to provide notice.
As is always the case with an objective standard, "reasonableness"
is a fact-specific characteristic dependent upon the vagaries of
any given situation.
Ironically, the same critics of the Patriot Act who complain
that it makes the federal judiciary subservient to the executive
branch of government seek to divest judges of the discretion to
set a reasonable period for notice to be given of a surreptitious
search." Limiting the bases for which a court may extend the
notification period to the three instances specified in the SAFE
Act, rather than for "good cause shown" as provided in section
213, only further reduces the autonomy of judges to adapt a
delayed notification warrant to the particular facts of any given
case. Courts have always been the doorkeeper for the warrant
process, and Congress, in the Patriot Act, has wisely given federal
judges the discretion to fashion the details of providing notice of
a covert search.
The SAFE Act would also require the Attorney General to
submit a report to Congress, made available to the public, every
six months summarizing the number of requests for, and grants
and denials of, delayed notification warrants. The Patriot Act
requires such reporting to Congress for other law enforcement
techniques,6" but its sudden application to delayed notification
warrants would be unusual. Delayed notification warrants pre-
date the Patriot Act by at least fifteen years and prosecutors did
not have to inform Congress of their issuance. Fifteen years of
67. Id.
68. See 149 CONG. REc. S12,386 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 2003) (statement of Sen.
Durbin).
69. For example, section 215 of the Patriot Act requires the Attorney
General to inform Congress of the number of times agents have sought an
order from the FISA Court of Review for the production of tangible things from
businesses and other entities. Patriot Act § 215, 115 Stat. at 286-88 (to be codi-
fied at 50 U.S.C. § 1862).
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practice with delayed notification warrants did not spur a need
for congressional oversight of their issuance. Since the Patriot
Act only codified existing law,70 one wonders why passage of sec-
tion 213 would now trigger congressional concern about surrep-
titious searches where no such concern previously existed.
Finally, the SAFE Act would sunset the delayed notification
warrant provisions of section 213 on December 31, 2005-the
sunset date for other provisions in the Patriot Act. This proposal
of the SAFE Act is puzzling as well, given the pedigree of delayed
notification warrants. One issue raised by such a repeal of sec-
tion 213 would be its effect on the validity of Freitas and Villegas.
Arguably, these cases would remain good law, but their legiti-
macy would certainly be questioned. At the least, sunsetting sec-
tion 213 would introduce much uncertainty into the area of
delayed notification warrants-an area where courts and scholars
have requested guidance, not ambiguity, from Congress.
The SAFE Act does not represent the only challenge to sec-
tion 213 and delayed notification warrants. The Otter Amend-
ment was an attempt to bar federal law enforcement agencies
from using their budgeted funds to seek delayed notification war-
rants.71 This proposal would not repeal or amend section 213,
but would render it meaningless by refusing to allow law enforce-
ment agents to request, and judges to issue, delayed notification
warrants. Arguably, such a tactic would not only be more draco-
nian than the SAFE Act, which would permit the issuance of
delayed notification warrants, but would more severely hamstring
thejudiciary's right to decide the contours of the Fourth Amend-
ment. Completely proscribing the issuance of delayed notifica-
tion warrants differs practically little, if at all, from holding them
unconstitutional. The House of Representatives approved the
Otter Amendment on July 23, 2003, but the Senate did not move
this legislation out of the upper chamber. Efforts to pass mea-
sures similar to the Otter Amendment during the current con-
gressional session have not been successful.
II. RoVING WIRETAPS
A. Roving Wiretaps Under FISA
In 1978, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act ("FISA"), which established rules and procedures for
the government's gathering of foreign intelligence information
70. See supra Part I.B.
71. H.R. 2799, 108th Cong. § 804 (1st Sess. 2003) ("None of the funds
made available in this Act may be used to seek a delay under section 3103a(b)
of Title 18, United States Code.").
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through electronic surveillance. 72  Electronic surveillance
includes the interception of wire or radio communications such
as a "wiretap" of a telephone call.7 3 To obtain a wiretap, a fed-
eral officer must make the appropriate showing in an application
to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (the "FISA
Court"), which can issue the wiretap order ex parte. 4 Prior to
the Patriot Act, the government could seek, and the FISA Court
could issue, a wiretap only for a particular communication facility
(e.g., a particular phone).
Section 206 of the Patriot Act amended FISA to permit "rov-
ing wiretaps" (e.g., a wiretap that follows the target from phone
to phone) in certain circumstances.7 In particular, section 206
permits a roving wiretap only where "the [FISA] Court finds that
the actions of the target of the application may have the effect of
thwarting the identification of a specified [communication facil-
ity].'176 The advantage to law enforcement from a roving wiretap
as compared to a static wiretap is that with a roving wiretap, "the
government need not return to court for a new surveillance
order every time the target changes location, but instead can pre-
sent a generic order to the new carrier, landlord, or custodian,
directing their assistance to assure that the surveillance may be
undertaken as soon as technically feasible."
77
Critics claim that the Patriot Act, by permitting roving wire-
taps for foreign intelligence purposes, "has place[d] innocent
individuals at risk for intrusive government surveillance. 78 The
Patriot Act, however, is not the progenitor of roving wiretaps.
Indeed, roving wiretaps have long been permitted in criminal
investigations of certain enumerated offenses (e.g., controlled
substance offenses). The Patriot Act, in large part, merely ena-
bled the government to use a tool, roving wiretaps, in terrorism
72. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804-1805 (2000 & Supp. I 2001); see also In re Sealed
Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717, 722-23 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
73. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f) (2000 & Supp. I 2001).
74. 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (delineating the requirements for the FISA Court to
issue an order for electronic surveillance, including a wiretap).
75. Patriot Act, 115 Stat. at 282 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1862); see
also ACLU v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20, 23 (D.D.C. 2003) ("With
a roving wiretap, the government can intercept all of a suspect's communica-
tions relating to the conduct under investigation, regardless of the suspect's
location, and regardless of what particular phone or e-mail account he may be
using.").
76. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B).
77. ACLU, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 23 (citing H.R. REP. No. 107-236, pt. 1, at
60 (Oct. 11, 2001)).
78. Jennifer C. Evans, Comment, Hijacking Civil Liberties: The USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001, 33 Loy. U. CHi. L. J. 933, 980 (2002).
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investigations that law enforcement officers already had
employed in sundry criminal investigations.
B. Roving Wiretaps Under Title III
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court held that the
Fourth Amendment permitted wiretapping in certain circum-
stances.7 1 Congress codified the requirements for wiretapping in
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 ("Title III").8 ° Initially, Title III only permitted a "fixed
wiretap" of a particular phone line. In 1986, Congress amended
Tide III to account for updated technologies.8 1 The amend-
ments to Tide III permitted "roving wiretaps," but only where the
requesting official could show the court that the person believed
to be committing the criminal offense had a purpose "to thwart
interception by changing [communication] facilities."8 2 In 1998,
Congress changed the standard to justify a "roving wiretap" to
one where the court finds that "there is probable cause to believe
that the person's actions could have the effect of thwarting inter-
ception from a specified [communication] facility."
83
Courts have held that a "roving wiretap" under Title III does
not violate the Fourth Amendment.8 4 In United States v. Petti, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") applied for and received
judicial authorization for wiretap surveillance of the phones the
defendant was suspected of using to further a money laundering
scheme.85 The roving wiretap was used because the defendant
had taken steps to prevent interception of his communications,
79. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 50-53 (1967); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967).
80. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2000) (delineating requirements to permit
electronic surveillance including probable cause that an individual is commit-
ting a particular enumerated offense and that normal investigative procedures
have been tried to obtain the information but were unsuccessful).
81. United States v. Petti, 973 F.2d 1441, 1443-44 (9th Cir. 1992) (dis-
cussing the legislative history of Title III); S. REP. No. 99-541, at 1 (1986) ("The
bill amends the 1968 law to update and clarify federal privacy protections and
standards in light of dramatic changes in new computer and telecommunica-
tions technologies.").
82. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(b) (ii) (1986).
83. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-
272, §604(a)(1), 112 Stat. 2396, 2413 (1998) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(11) (b) (ii) (2000)).
84. United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1128 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding
that "roving bug" surveillance for the interception of oral communications
under Title III does not violate the Fourth Amendment); see also Petti, 973 F.2d
at 1445 (holding that "roving wiretap" under Title III does not violate the
Fourth Amendment).
85. Petti, 973 F.2d at 1442.
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including thwarting the use of a body wire on a confidential
source.8 6 With the roving wiretap, the FBI monitored the defen-
dant's conversations over various and changing public tele-
phones for approximately a year and a half. 7 Based in part on
information gained through the roving wiretap, the United
States indicted the defendant on money laundering and cur-
rency reporting offenses. The defendant moved to suppress the
information gained through the roving wiretap on the grounds
that such interception violated the particularity requirement of
the Fourth Amendment.
8 8
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that
the roving wiretap provision of Title III did not violate the
Fourth Amendment and that evidence gained through the rov-
ing wiretap was admissible at trial.8 9 In particular, the court
found that "the absence of a description of the specific tele-
phone facilities from which the suspect's conversations are to be
intercepted" did not violate "the Fourth Amendment's require-
ment that no warrant shall issue except one 'particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched."90 The particularity requirement
of the Fourth Amendment requires:
The description of the place to be searched must not be so
broad as to allow the search of places for which probable
cause to search has not been demonstrated, or so vague
that an executing officer might mistakenly search a place
for which authorization was not granted. If the description
of the place to be searched avoids these dangers, it may
comply with the particularity requirement even though it
does not specify the physical location of the place to be
surveilled.9
According to the Ninth Circuit, the roving wiretap provision
of Title III assuaged the dangers the particularity requirement
sought to avoid. The statute did not permit a "wide-ranging
exploratory search"9 2 and eliminated the "possibility of abuse or
mistake."9 " Title III required that law enforcement officers
surveil only the telephone facilities used by an identified speaker
86. Id. at 1445 n.7.
87. United States v. Silberman, 732 F. Supp. 1057, 1058 (S.D. Cal. 1990),
affd, 973 F.2d 1441 (1992).
88. Id.
89. Petti, 973 F.2d at 1445 (" [T] he district court correctly found the provi-
sion permitting roving wiretaps to be constitutional.").
90. Id. at 1444 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1445.
93. Id.
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and employ "minimization procedures to ensure that only con-
versations relating to a crime in which the speaker is a suspected
participant are intercepted."9 4  In addition, a roving wiretap
could be obtained only where the government could convince a
court that the suspect purposefully thwarted interception by
changing communication facilities.9" Given these safeguards,
the roving, as well as fixed, wiretap interceptions under Title III
did not constitute a "greater invasion of privacy than necessary to
meet the legitimate needs of law enforcement. "96
C. A Comparison of Roving Wiretaps Under Section 206 and
Title III
In 2002, the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court of Review (the "FISA Court of Review") 97 considered
whether FISA, as amended by section 206 of the Patriot Act per-
mitting roving wiretaps, passes constitutional muster under the
Fourth Amendment.9" Significant to the analysis was the similar-
ity between the roving wiretap provisions of Title III and FISA.99
The FISA Court of Review compared FISA with Title III with
respect to the three traditional requirements for reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment: (1) a warrant issued by a
detached, neutral magistrate, (2) probable cause to believe that
the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or con-
viction for a particular offense, and (3) a particular description
of the things to be seized and the place to be searched.'
As to the first requirement, both FISA and Title III "require
prior judicial scrutiny of an application for an order authorizing
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. Id. (citations and quotations omitted); see also Clifford S. Fishman,
Interception of Communications in Exigent Circumstances: The Fourth Amendment, Fed-
eral Legislation, and the United States Department of Justice, 22 GA. L. REv. 1 (1987)
(concluding that Title III's roving wiretap provision is constitutional); Michael
Goldsmith, Eavesdropping Reform: The Legality of Roving Surveillance, 1987 U. ILL.
L. REv. 401.
97. The United States appeals unfavorable rulings from the FISA Court to
the FISA Court of Review. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b) (2000) (establishing the
FISA Court of Review).
98. In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717 (2002) (U.S. Foreign Int.
Surv. Ct. Rev.).
99. Id. at 737 ("[In asking whether FISA procedures can be regarded as
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we think it is instructive to compare
those procedures and requirements with their Title III counterparts.").
100. Id. at 738 (discussing Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard)
(citations and quotations omitted).
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electronic surveillance." '' Moreover, prior precedent has estab-
lished that a FISAjudge is a neutral and detached magistrate.0 2
Moving to the second requirement, Title III and FISA differ
in their respective showings of probable cause necessary to
obtain a roving wiretap."0 3 Under Title III, the government must
demonstrate probable cause "that an individual is committing,
has committed, or is about to commit" a specified predicate
offense.'0 4 "FISA by contrast requires a showing of probable
cause that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power."' 0 5 A U.S. person 1 6 cannot be "an agent of a foreign
power" without a showing of criminal activity unless that person
is engaged in espionage and clandestine intelligence activities of
a foreign power.'0 7 In that case, the government need only show
that the person's activities "may involve a violation of the crimi-
nal statutes of the United States."'0 8
Congress lowered the probable cause standard in espionage
and clandestine intelligence cases involving a U.S. person
because "it was fully aware that such foreign intelligence crimes
may be particularly difficult to detect."' 0 9 Notably, this lower
standard does not apply in other FISA areas (e.g., terrorism
investigations). In addition, even in the U.S. person espionage
case, FISA, but not Title III, requires a probable cause showing
that the target is acting "for or on behalf of a foreign power. ' 10
Without a probable cause showing that the person is an agent of
a foreign power, FISA forbids use of a roving wiretap. Further,
"no U.S. person may be considered a foreign power or an agent
of a foreign power solely upon the basis of activities protected by
the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States.""'




104. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (a) (2000), quoted in Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 738.
105. Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 738 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (3)).
106. FISA actually refers to a "United States person," a group that
includes "a citizen of the United States" as well as "an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence." 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (i) (2000). See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b) (2)
(defining "agent of a foreign power" under FISA) (citations omitted).
107. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b) (2); Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 738.
108. Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 738.
109. Id. at 739.
110. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b) (2); Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 739.
111. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (2000); Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 739 (list-
ing examples where FISA would not permit a roving wiretap).
112. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2000).
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Thus, "FISA applies only to certain carefully delineated, and par-
ticularly serious, foreign threats to national security."
1 13
The particularity requirements of Title III and FISA likewise
pertain to different aspects of the interception of communica-
tions. One aspect is the nexus between the facility and the com-
munications coming across that facility. "Tide III requires
probable cause to believe that particular communications con-
cerning the specified crime will be obtained through the inter-
ception."1 14 On the other hand, FISA "requires an official to
designate the type of foreign intelligence information being
sought, and to certify that the information sought is foreign intel-
ligence information."" 5 A national security officer, typically the
FBI Director, must make, and the Attorney General or the Attor-
ney General's Deputy must approve, this certification."
6 "When
the target is a U.S. person, the FISA judge reviews the certifica-
tion for clear error"117 -a standard lower than a probable cause
finding by a judge reviewing a Title III application.
Another aspect of particularity that differs between the two
statutes is the connection between the target and the pertinent
communications. Generally, Title III requires probable cause to
believe that the facilities subject to surveillance are either (a)
"being used or are about to be used in connection with the com-
mission of a crime,""' or (b) "are leased to, listed in the name
of, or used by the individual committing the crime."'
1 9 In the
former situation, Tide III requires only that an individual, not
necessarily the target, use the facility in connection with a
crime."0 Under a roving wiretap, Title III permits only the inter-
ception of conversations to which a targeted individual is a
party.12 1 In contrast, FISA requires a showing of probable cause
to believe that the target (i.e., the foreign power or agent) is
using, or about to use, "each of the facilities or places at which
the surveillance is directed."' 22 Ordinarily, "FISA requires less of
a nexus between the facility and the pertinent communications
113. Id.
114. Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 739 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(b)).
115. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518.
116. Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 739; see also 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (2000).
117. Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 739.
118. Id. at 739-40 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(d)).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 740.
121. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(b)(ii) (delineating requirements for a rov-
ing wiretap); see also United States v. Silberman, 732 F. Supp. 1057, 1058 (S.D.
Cal. 1990), affd, 973 F.2d 1441 (1992) (discussing the requirements for a rov-
ing wiretap under Title II).
122. Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 740 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(B)).
20051
182 NOTRIE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 19
than Title III, but more of a nexus between the target and the
pertinent communication" than does Title III.2' In the context
of roving wiretaps, however, both Title III and FISA require a
link between the target and the communication captured by the
surveillance.
Title III and FISA are comparable in other respects as well.
For example, "[b]oth statutes have a 'necessity' provision which
requires the court to find that the information is not available
through normal investigative procedures.', 24 With respect to the
duration of the surveillance, Title III orders run for thirty days,
while a FISA order for a U.S. person may last up to ninety days. 1 2 5
Each statute also provides for "minimization" procedures on the
information intercepted. Under Title III, agents must operate
the wiretap "in such a way as to minimize the interception of
communications not otherwise subject to interception. "1 26 That
is, the government may only intercept criminal conversations
and must discontinue the interception when the targets engage
in non-criminal conversations. 27 FISA requires minimization of
what is "acquired, retained, or disseminated,"1 2 1 though normally
these surveillance devices intercept without interruption and
agents "minimize" the communications only after they acquire
them. 129 The post-acquisition minimization requirements for
FISA reflect the nature of intelligence investigations which often
involve ambiguous and/or coded communications. 130
Finally, Title III and FISA each have notice requirements of
the interception of communications after surveillance has ended.
Title III requires notice to the target, and the judge may order
notice to other persons whose communications were inter-
cepted.1 3 ' FISA, on the other hand, does not require notice of
123. Id.
124. Id. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (2000), with 50 U.S.C.
§ 1804(a) (7)(E) (ii) (2000), and 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(5) (2000).
125. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5), with 50 U.S.C. § 1805(e)(1). Sealed
Case, 310 F.3d at 740 (discussing duration provisions for Title III and FISA rov-
ing wiretaps). FISA permits surveillance for periods longer than ninety days in
circumstances not involving a U.S. person. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(e)(1).
126. 28 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1998), quoted in Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 740
n.23.
127. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 140 (1978) (holding that an
objective standard governs the decision whether to "minimize" a conversation
under Title III).
128. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(e)(3).
129. See Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 740 (discussing minimization procedures
under FISA).
130. See id. at 741 (quoting Scott, 436 U.S. at 140).
131. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (2000); see also Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at
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the interception "unless the government 'intends to enter into
evidence or otherwise use or disclose' such communications in a
trial or other enumerated official proceedings."
13 2  Conse-
quently, if evidence obtained through a FISA roving wiretap is
used at a criminal proceeding, the government must provide
notice of the interception to the defendant.""
3 Absent official
use of the intercepted information, however, the need for
secrecy in foreign intelligence matters outweighs a target's inter-
est in notification.
1, 4
After analyzing these two statutes, the FISA Court of Review
concluded that they were equivalent in "many significant
respects."' 3 5 The court, however, stopped short of deciding
whether a FISA order for electronic surveillance satisfies the
requirements of Title II.136 The close similarities of the two stat-
utes helped lead the court to answer in the affirmative the dispos-
itive question-"whether FISA, as amended by the Patriot Act, is
a reasonable response based on a balance of the legitimate need
of the government for foreign intelligence information to pro-
tect against national security threats with the protected rights of
citizens."' 3 7 According to the court, "FISA as amended is consti-
tutional because the surveillances it authorizes are
reasonable.""3 8
The FISA Court of Review reached the correct result in per-
mitting roving wiretaps under FISA pursuant to the Patriot Act.
Certainly, if government agents can use a roving wiretap within
the confines of the Fourth Amendment to investigate controlled
substance offenses, the same surveillance tool should be available
to the government to gather foreign intelligence to protect
national security. Again, this Article focuses not so much on the
normative question of whether a roving wiretap should be per-
mitted at all but, rather, on the issue of the degree to which the
Patriot Act expanded the government's power to conduct surveil-
lance. If a roving wiretap can be used to investigate, disrupt, and
take down a cocaine distribution conspiracy composed of Ameri-
can citizens, then, surely, its use to investigate, disrupt, and dis-
semble a foreign terrorist plot to kill American citizens is
justified. The differences between a roving wiretap under Title
III and one under FISA are justified by the differences between
132. Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 741 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c)).
133. See id.
134. See id. (quoting S. REP. No. 95-701, at 12 (1978)).
135. Id. at 741.
136. See id. at 742.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 746.
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investigating a criminal enterprise and investigating the activities
of a foreign power or its agents.
Congress recognized the appropriateness of using a roving
wiretap in terrorist investigations when it initially enacted Title
III in 1986. In discussing the standard to justify issuance of a
roving wiretap, the Senate Report accompanying the Title III leg-
islation used a terrorism investigation as an apropos application
of this law enforcement tool:
[T]he application [for a roving wiretap] must show that
the person committing the offense has a purpose to thwart
interception by changing facilities. In these cases, the
court must find that the applicant has shown that such a
purpose has been evidenced by the suspect. An example of a
situation which would meet this test would be an alleged terrorist
who went from phone booth to phone booth numerous times to
avoid interception. A person whose telephone calls were
intercepted who said that he or she was planning on mov-
ing from phone to phone or to pay phones to avoid detec-
tion also would have demonstrated that purpose. 139
The Patriot Act amended FISA to permit a roving wiretap in
just this situation-where the court, not the government agent,
determines that the target of the surveillance is changing facili-
ties to thwart interception. 40
In making roving wiretaps available in foreign intelligence
investigations, Congress, in the Patriot Act, merely made availa-
ble in this area a tool that government agents had long employed
in certain criminal investigations. Thus, the roving wiretap provi-
sion of the Patriot Act did not expand government power but,
rather, equipped national security officers with a tool that Con-
gress had long endorsed for terrorist investigations. Given the
purpose of FISA, most Americans would be surprised, if not out-
raged, to learn that roving wiretaps have only recently become
available in foreign intelligence gathering operations. 4
D. Criticisms of Section 206 of the Patriot Act
As with delayed notification search warrants, critics of the
Patriot Act seek to amend, if not repeal, its provision for roving
139. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 32 (1986) (emphasis added).
140. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (Supp. I 2001) (delineating the stan-
dard for a roving wiretap).
141. See Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 746 (stating that "FISA's general program-
matic purpose, to protect the nation against terrorists and espionage threats
directed by foreign powers, has from its outset been distinguishable from 'ordi-
nary crime control'").
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wiretaps. Once again, the SAFE Act is representative of such crit-
icism. The SAFE Act seeks to eliminate so-called 'John Doe" rov-
ing wiretaps under FISA-a roving wiretap that specifies neither
the identity of the target, nor the specific facilities the target is
using.'4 2 The SAFE Act seeks to accomplish this goal by amend-
ing 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c) to require "a description of the target
and the nature and location of the facilities and places at which
the electronic surveillance will be directed" when "the identity of
the target is not known."
'4 3 Furthermore, when "the facility or
place at which the surveillance will be directed is not known at
the time the order is issued," then "the surveillance [can] be con-
ducted only when the presence of the target at a particular facil-




The SAFE Act, despite its protestations to the contrary, cir-
cumscribes section 206 of the Patriot Act too greatly, at least rela-
tive to roving wiretaps under Title III.' First, the SAFE Act
need not address an "unknown target" situation because FISA
already requires the government agent to provide either the tar-
get's identity or description. 1 4
6 Where the government agent
does not know the target's name, the FISA Court must receive a
description of the person. A "phantom target" cannot be the
subject of a roving wiretap. Moreover, once described, that per-
son is the target of the roving wiretap, and the government agent
must apply to the FISA Court for a new surveillance order if a
new, different target emerges. The ability of a national security
officer only to describe, but not identify, a target involved with an
agent of a foreign power does not justify narrowing the scope of
roving wiretaps under FISA given that the participants in such
clandestine activities are typically quite adept at cloaking their
identities.
The second change that the SAFE Act would make to section
206 circumscribes roving wiretaps under FISA more closely than
roving wiretaps under Title 111-a result that seems to be exactly
opposite to the relative risks of national security investigations
under FISA compared to routine criminal investigations under
Title III. Surely, national security officers tasked with keeping
142. See Security and Freedom Ensured Act of 2003 (SAFE Act), S. 1709,
108th Cong., § 2.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See 149 CONG. Rac. S12,384 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 2003) (statement of
Sen. Craig) (averring that the SAFE Act only makes "significant" not "sweeping"
changes to the Patriot Act).
146. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(1)(A) (2000).
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the United States free from foreign terrorist activities should be
given at least the same investigative tools as law enforcement
officers seeking to ferret out the local marijuana distributor. The
SAFE Act, however, would permit a roving wiretap under FISA
only when the government agent could ascertain with certainty
that the target of the investigation is present at a particular facil-
ity or place.147 Title III is not so strict. Under Title III, a roving
wiretap can be employed for "such time as it is reasonable to pre-
sume that the person identified in the application is or was rea-
sonably proximate to the instrument through which such
communication will be or was transmitted." 4 ' Title III permits
an officer to analyze the facts and presume that the target is pre-
sent at, or in reasonable proximity to, the facility or place to be
surveilled. The SAFE Act would preclude government agents in
a national security investigation from acting based on the facts
and their intuition and force them to be certain of the target's
presence, not just proximity, before utilizing a roving wiretap
order from the FISA Court.
FISA should not be so narrowly cabined. National security
concerns strongly favor broader boundaries for FISA surveillance
than for Title III surveillance, but at a minimum, these bounda-
ries should be co-extensive. Again, the normative question
whether roving wiretaps should be permitted is not the issue.
Rather, the point made is that the Patriot Act has merely pro-
vided national security agents with law enforcement tools that
criminal investigators freely use on a daily basis without criticism
and hyperbole. Critics of the Patriot Act, such as the supporters
of the SAFE Act, would limit the roving wiretap provision of the
Patriot Act so greatly as to make roving wiretaps under FISA less
available and less effective than those issued under Title III. The
logic of such a result is questionable both in jurisprudential and
practical terms. For the same reasons, Congress should not sun-
set section 206 of the Patriot Act as scheduled on December 31,
2005, while maintaining roving wiretaps under Title 111.149
III. SEIZURE OF BUSINESS RECoRDs
Section 215, the provision of the Patriot Act permitting the
FISA Court to order the production of "any tangible thing," has
attracted the ire of many critics of the legislation. In particular,
critics of the Patriot Act argue that section 215 greatly expands
147. See SAFE Act, S. 1709, § 2.
148. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(ll) (b) (iv) (2000).
149. See Patriot Act § 224 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 2510) (delineating the
provisions of the Patriot Act that are to sunset on December 31, 2005).
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the authority of law enforcement officials because a person's
library records are now potentially discoverable under FISA."
5 ° A
comparison of section 215 with the traditional powers of a grand
jury reveals, however, that the authority of the FISA Court under
the Patriot Act to compel the production of documents, includ-
ing library records, is not nearly as broad as the power of a grand
jury in an ordinary criminal investigation. Section 215 by its
terms vests the FISA Court with significantly less power than that
enjoyed by a grand jury under the common law.
A. Use of Grand Jury Subpoena To Compel Production of Records
and Things
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the
"grand jury sits not to determine guilt or innocence, but to assess
whether there is an adequate basis for bringing a criminal
charge." 5 In performing its role, the grand jury receives evi-
dence only from the prosecutor-a venerable practice from
English common law and one consistently upheld by the
Supreme Court. 5 2 The grand jury has broad investigatory pow-
ers and can consider evidence derived from a number of
sources. 153
The information from these sources is generally obtained
through the issuance of a subpoena requiring a person to appear
to testify before, and/or to produce documents to, the grand
jury. Typically, a grand jury subpoena is prepared by a prosecu-
tor, issued by a court clerk with little or no oversight by a judge,
and served by a law enforcement officer.
154 Not uncommonly, a
grand jury subpoena for documents permits the source of the
information to deliver the documents directly to the law enforce-
ment agent, rather than to make delivery to the grand jury.
5 5
The agent will then report his receipt of the documents to the
150. See ANN BEESON & JAMEEL JAFFER, UNPATRIOTIC ACTS: THE FBI's
POWER TO RIFLE THROUGH YOUR RECORDS AND PERSONAL BELONGING WITHOUT
TELLINGYOU (2003), at http://www.aclu.org/Files/OpenFile.cfm?id=13245 (on
file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
151. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51 (1992); see also United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-44 (1974) (discussing the nature of grand
jury proceedings).
152. See Williams, 504 U.S. at 51.
153. See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 344.
154. See In re Grand Jury Matters, 751 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1984) (discuss-
ing grand jury subpoenas).
155. United States v. Nathan, 816 F.2d 230, 234 (6th Cir. 1987) (finding
that a recipient of a grand jury subpoena may disclose the requested informa-
tion to a government employee who then makes the disclosure to the grand
jury).
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grand jury and request its permission to retain the documents to
further his investigation. The grand jury may never actually see
the documents produced from the issuance of its subpoena,
though it has the right to request their physical production.
Importantly, in the vast majority of cases, the grand jury
issues its subpoenas with no judicial involvement.' 1 6 The, court
does not approve the scope or substance of the subpoena and is
not informed of a source's compliance with the subpoena."'
Additionally, the grand jury is not limited in the type of entities
from which it can request information or testimony or the type of
documents to be produced." 8 An important caveat to the fore-
going principle, however, is that a grand jury cannot violate a
privilege that is created by the United States Constitution, stat-
utes, or case law (e.g., Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, attorney-client privilege).1 5 9  Thus, generally
speaking, issuance of a grand jury subpoena is proper unless
"there is no reasonable possibility that the category of materials
the Government seeks will produce information relevant to the
general subject of the grand jury's investigation,""1 6 or a judge
determines that the subpoena is "unreasonable and oppres-
sive." '16 1 First Amendment activities rarely, if ever, of themselves
provide a defense or shield against production of documents in
response to a grand jury subpoena.
Finally, a grand jury is cloaked in secrecy.162 Generally
speaking, only the prosecutor, court reporter, and witness are
permitted before the grand jury.16 3 Disclosure to the public of
matters occurring before the grand jury is forbidden, except that
many jurisdictions, including the federal courts, permit a witness
to discuss his testimony before the grand jury.1 64
156. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343 (noting the lack of judicial monitoring
over grand jury proceedings).
157. See Grand Jury Matters, 751 F.2d at 16 (noting that grand jury subpoe-
nas are instruments of the United States Attorney's Office or some other. execu-
tive branch department though they are issued in the name of the United
States district court).
158. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343 (discussing the types of information a
grand jury may subpoena).
159. Id. at 346 (discussing limits on a grand jury's subpoena power).
160. United States v. R. Enters., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991).
161. Grand Jury Matters, 751 F.2d at 18 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)).
162. FED. R. CmiM. P. 6(e)(2)(B) (discussing secrecy requirements of a
.federal grand jury).
163. Id.
164. See id. 6(e)(3) (discussing disclosure rules of a federal grand jury).
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B. Section 215 Permits Production of Tangible Things Pursuant To
Court Order
The Patriot Act expanded the power of the FISA Court to
issue orders compelling the production of information, in partic-
ular business records. 1 65 Prior to the Patriot Act, the FISA Court
could order the production of "records" only from "a common
carrier, public accommodation facility, physical storage facility or
vehicle rental facility. 1 6 6 Moreover, the government official had
to certify that "there [were] specific and articulable facts giving
reason to believe that the person to whom the records pertain
[was] a foreign power or the agent of a foreign power." 167 Sec-
tion 215 of the Patriot Act changed both the scope of, and stan-
dard for, a court order for the production of records and
documents.
Under section 215, the Director of the FBI or a designee of
the Director, who cannot be ranked lower than Assistant Special
Agent in Charge, "may make an application for an order requir-
ing the production of any tangible things (including books,
records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investiga-
tion to protect against international terrorism or clandestine
intelligence activities."1 6 Now, the scope of the court order is
not limited to "records," but can cover "any tangible thing,"
including any type of business record. Section 215 also elimi-
nated the previous restriction on the type of entity from which
information could be obtained and the certification requirement
for the nexus between the target and the records to be pro-
duced.'6 9 Presently, tangible things sought under section 215
must either (1) pertain to foreign intelligence information not
concerning a United States person or (2) protect against interna-
tional terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.' 7 ° Section
215 is scheduled to sunset on December 31, 2005.171
Unlike prior law, section 215 expressly provides for First
Amendment protection against a court order for the production
165. See Patriot Act § 215 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1862 (Supp. I
2001)) (authorizing the issue of FISA Court of Review orders to compel produc-
tion of business records in foreign intelligence and international terrorism
investigations).
166. 50 U.S.C. § 1862(a) (2000).
167. Id. § 1862(b) (2) (B).
168. 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (a)(1) (Supp. I 2001).
169. Compare 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861 (a)(1)-(b) (Supp. 1 2001), with 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1862(a)-(b) (2) (B) (2000).
170. 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (b)(2) (Supp. I 2001).
171. See Patriot Act § 224 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 2510) (delineating the
provisions of the Patriot Act that are to sunset on December 31, 2005).
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of documents. In particular, section 215 prohibits the FISA
Court from ordering production of documents or records for an
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence investigation
of a United States person based solely on "activities protected by
the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
' 17 2
Section 215 also requires the Attorney General to report every six
months to Congress on the number of times agents have sought
a court order under this section as well as the number of times
such requests were granted, modified, or denied.17 ' As of the
date of this writing, the FBI has yet to act upon a FISA applica-
tion filed under section 215.174 Importantly, one constant both
pre- and post-Patriot Act is that the FISA Court, not the govern-
ment agent, is the authority that issues the order compelling the
production of records pursuant to a foreign intelligence or ter-
rorism investigation.
175
C. Criticisms of Section 215 of the Patriot Act
Like other provisions of the Patriot Act, section 215 has also
been the subject of much criticism and attack. The SAFE Act
exemplifies this criticism by proposing to amend section 215. In
particular, the SAFE Act would reinstate the previous test to per-
mit the FISA Court to order the production of documents, viz.,
the government agent must provide "specific and articulable
facts giving reason to believe that the person to whom the
records pertain is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power."' 7 6 The SAFE Act would retain the Patriot Act's expan-
sion of the scope of a FISA Court order to "any tangible things"
and to any type of entity, including libraries and bookstores.
1 7 7
The SAFE Act's proposed modification of section 215 purport-
edly responds to allegations that the Patriot Act permits govern-
172. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861(a) (1) & (a)(2)(B) (Supp. I2001).
173. See 50 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (Supp. 12001).
174. SeeACLU v. U.S. Dep't. ofJustice, 321 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2004).
175. Many critics of the Patriot Act have either failed to recognize or
respect the involvement of the FISA Court of Review in the production of docu-
ments under section 215. SeeJohn W. Whitehead, The President is Wrong: The
USA Patriot Act Should Be Terminated, RUTHERFORD INSTITUTE,Jan. 26, 2004, avail-
able at www.rutherford.org/articles-db/commentary.asp?record-id-262 (on file
with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy) ("The Patriot Act
allows government agents to conduct document searches and seizures of
businesses .. ").
176. SAFE Act, S. 1709, § 4.
177. See 149 CONG. REc. S12,386 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 2003) (statement of
Sen. Durbin) (noting that the SAFE Act "retains the expansion of the business
record provision to include all business records, including library records").
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ment agents to seize the library records of innocent Americans in
violation of their civil liberties.
1 78
The proposed modification of section 215 is unjustified
since an order compelling the production of documents under
this section is significantly more limited in scope and frequency
than a grand jury subpoena in an ordinary criminal investigation.
The FBI's ability to seek disclosure of tangible items in a national
security/foreign terrorism investigation under section 215 is not
as great as an ordinary law enforcement officer's ability to seek
the production of documents in routine criminal investigations.
The FISA Court has significantly less authority to order the pro-
duction of business records than does a grand jury. Certainly, if
a grand jury can compel a library to produce the records for a
patron while investigating the possible commission of a garden
variety crime, the FISA Court should have the authority to order
the production of these same records pursuant to a foreign ter-
rorism or clandestine intelligence investigation under the limited
circumstances set forth in section 215. Once again, the Patriot
Act has not fueled Big Brother but, rather, provided national
security investigators with a tool, in this case an application to the
FISA Court for an order to produce documents, similar to one
that criminal investigators and prosecutors have long had at their
disposal in the form of a grand jury subpoena.
A FISA Court order under section 215 is more limited than a
grand jury subpoena in several respects. First, as mentioned
supra, a grand jury subpoena is subject to little or no judicial
oversight. A grand jury is an independent body operating
outside the direct purview of the judiciary. Judicial involvement,
on the other hand, is an indispensable aspect of section 215,
since the FISA Court is the authority that orders the production
of documents. The FISA Court is free to deny the FBI's applica-
tion for an order under section 215. Second, section 215 applies
only to foreign intelligence or terrorism investigations-domes-
tic terrorism investigations, much less ordinary crimes, are cate-
gorically excluded from its domain. Of course, a grand jury has
authority to issue a subpoena for the investigation of any criminal
offense. Third, section 215 expressly disavows a FISA Court
order in any investigation of a United States person conducted
solely upon the basis of First Amendment activities.' 7 9 The First
Amendment does not similarly constrain a grand jury investiga-
178. See id. at S12,387 (statement of Sen. Durbin) ("The SAFE Act would
permit the FBI to obtain the records related to the suspected terrorists, but not
records related to innocent Americans who are not suspected terrorists.").
179. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861(a)(1)-(a)(2)(B) (Supp. I 2001).
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tion. Fourth, applications made under section 215 are subject to
strict congressional oversight, while Congress does not scrutinize
the scope and subject matter of grand jury subpoenas.
A grand jury's authority to force a public library to produce
its records, a bone of considerable contention for the critics of
section 215, shows that Congress, in enacting section 215, did not
grant the FISA Court with a heretofore unknown power. Rather,
the passage of section 215 merely gave the FISA Court a consider-
ably more circumscribed authority to compel the production of
documents in a foreign intelligence investigation relative to the
subpoena power of a grandjury. Grandjuries have long enjoyed
the power to order a public library to produce its records, includ-
ing the records of a particular patron's activities at the facility.
For example, in Brown v. Johnston, a county prosecutor was
investigating certain mutilations of cattle occurring in the
area.18 0 The prosecutor, pursuant to state law, served on a public
library a subpoena duces tecum "requiring the custodian of
library records to appear and present 'all records of persons who
have checked out the books described in [the] State's applica-
tion.'""8 The books pertained to witchcraft and related top-
ics."8 2 Upon the library's receipt of the subpoena, a library
patron and the library board filed suit seeking to quash it.'83
The claimants argued that the subpoena contravened the state
statute mandating the confidentiality of library records.' 8 4 In
addition, they asserted the existence of a "library patron's privi-
lege" and that the subpoena infringed on their privacy interests
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.' 8 5
The Supreme Court of Iowa rejected the claimants' argu-
ments. 186 At the outset, the court noted that a patron's right of
privacy in library records must give way to the weightier public
interest in effective criminal investigations.'8 7  The court
expressly found, "The county attorney's investigative authority is
comparable to and in some instances in lieu of the grand jury.
As such, the county attorney's investigative power must be broad




184. Id. at 512 (discussing the state statute requiring confidentiality of all
records of a library which would reveal the identity of a patron seeking an item
from the library).
185. Id.
186. See id. at 513.
187. Id. at 511-12.
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to adequately discharge his public responsibility."' 88 Moreover,
the state statute cloaking library records in secrecy expressly per-
mitted disclosure upon the order of a court.1 89 The prosecutor's
subpoena duces tecum qualified as such an order.19 °
In rejecting the claimants' constitutional arguments, the
court looked to United States Supreme Court precedent on the
constitutional restrictions on a grand jury's subpoena power. In
particular, the court noted that the Supreme Court held in
Branzburg v. Hayes' and United States v. Nixon'9 2 that a reporter's
First Amendment privilege and the presidential executive privi-
lege, respectively, were subordinate to the power of the grand
jury in a criminal investigation.' 9 3 Given the Supreme Court's
position on the power of a grand jury, the court, assuming argu-
endo that a "library-patron's privilege" exists, ruled that "[t]he
State's interest in well-founded criminal charges and the fair
administration of criminal justice must be held to override the
claim of privilege here."'9 4 Consequently, the court upheld the
subpoena duces tecum and ordered the library to disclose to the
county prosecutor the requested records as part of the cattle
mutilation investigation. 95 The court ordered such production
of records even though "the State's investigation was only prelim-
inary ... no suspects [had been] identified... [and] the search
for information was [not] limited to any named library
patrons.""n' The court was solicitous of the prosecutor's need for
the information to narrow and focus his investigation.
9 7
Certainly, the government's interest in conducting foreign
terrorism investigations is at least as weighty as an Iowa county
prosecutor's interest in tracking down unlawful cattle killers. In
fact, national security agents in foreign terrorism investigations,
unlike prosecutors at the local, state, and federal levels, are lim-
ited by First Amendment concerns under section 215 of the
Patriot Act from requesting a court to order businesses, includ-
ing public libraries, to produce records. This feature of section
215, in and of itself, belies any argument that the Patriot Act, by
permitting the forced disclosure of library records in certain cir-
188. Id. at 512 (citations omitted).
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. 408 U.S. 665, 685 (1972).
192. 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974).
193. Brown, 328 N.W.2d at 512-13.
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cumstances, greatly expanded the power of law enforcement
agencies. Persons upset with the enactment of section 215
should be equally, if not more, appalled at the issuance of grand
jury subpoenas in a host of criminal investigations seeking the
production of a vast spectrum of private and public documents.
The Patriot Act through section 215, rather than extending
the reach of law enforcement beyond pre-existing limits, has,
once again, merely equipped national security agents with the
ability to request the FISA Court to order the production of tan-
gible things that a grand jury secretly conducting a routine crimi-
nal investigation could easily obtain. The logical consistency of
sunsetting section 215 in light of the traditional power of grand
juries is questionable at best. Though some would certainly
argue otherwise, a majority of Americans would likely support
granting the FISA Court-the judicial body overseeing foreign
terrorism investigations-with the same quantum of the power
that grand juries enjoy when investigating criminal offenses. Per-
mitting a grand jury to compel the production of library records
in the investigation of the slaying of cattle while denying the pro-
duction of such records in the investigation of terrorism activities
that threaten to kill thousands of American citizens seems both
practically and intellectually unreasonable. Congress, in passing
section 215, merely updated the power of the FISA Court in light
of the real threat posed by foreign terrorists. An examination of
section 215 through the prism of traditional grand jury functions
shows that such congressional action was not Orwellian but,
rather, a rational response to the real dangers of terrorism.
CONCLUSION
After the events of September 11, 2001, the world changed.
Congress realized that the threat to U.S. citizens from foreign
terrorists is real. Consequently, Congress enacted the Patriot
Act. Few pieces of legislation have ever been attacked as harshly
as the Patriot Act on the grounds that the statute emasculates
civil liberties. The foregoing review of the provisions of the
Patriot Act pertaining to delayed notification warrants, roving
wiretaps, and court-ordered production of business records
shows that, at least as to these three areas, critics of the Patriot
Act are misguided and misinformed.
Rather than expanding the power of government to hereto-
fore unknown levels, the Patriot Act merely allows investigators
of foreign terrorism and clandestine intelligence activities to
request a court to issue orders that are relatively common in ordi-
nary criminal investigations. In these three areas, the Patriot Act
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has neither created nor exacerbated Big Brother, but has only
made available to investigators tools long employed in routine
criminal matters. In fact, a true airing of the effect of these pro-
visions is more likely to draw the approval, rather than the ire, of
a majority of Americans.19 8 Given the sacrifices made on and
after 9/11, Congress and our fellow citizens deserve no less than
a clear exegesis of the Patriot Act, rather than political hyper-
bole. This Article has sought to make such a presentation and
concludes that, whatever else the Patriot Act might be, in regards
to delayed notification warrants, roving wiretaps, and document
production orders, Big Brother it is not.
198. The reasonableness of the Patriot Act was noted by the 9/11 Com-
mission charged with investigating the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.
In particular, the 9/11 Commission found many of the provisions of the Patriot
Act to be "relatively noncontroversial" such as those that updated the country's
"surveillance laws to reflect technological developments in a digital age." NAT'L
COMM'N ON THE TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 394 (2004). The Commission's finding reflects the testimony of many
witnesses who appeared before it and lauded the Patriot Act as a key weapon in
the country's arsenal against the war on terror. See Transcript: 9/11 Commission
Hearing, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2004, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wpdyn/articles/A9088-2004Aprl 3.html (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of
Law, Ethics & Public Policy) (transcribing testimony before the 9/11 Commis-
sion on April 13, 2004). In particular, former United States Attorney General
Janet Reno told the Commission that "generally everything that's been done in
the Patriot Act has been helpful I think while at the same time maintaining the
balance with respect to civil liberties .. " Id. Reno did state, however, that she
would like to learn more about the current administration's position on "FISA
searches" under section 215. Id.
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